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The strike is one of the most prominent elements in the
problem of the relation of capital to labor-especially prominent in view of the occurrences of the past few months-and
therefore one of the most important phenomena of our present
social condition. A state of affairs that permits a few men to
dictate whether or not the business of a whole section of
country shall continue or cease, and that renders a presumably
intelligent body of men the slaves of the dictators, is surely
of no ordinary consequence in a theoretically free country, to
say nothing of the disastrous results to the individual inhabitants of the region affected. And when to this is added the
wanton trampling on the rights of others, the reckless destruction of property, and the criminal disregard -and violation of
the sacredness of human life, that have characterized the more
recent strikes in a higher degree than any preceding, it is clear
that the problem demands most earnest attention from every
patriotic citizen, and that our national existence depends in no
small measure upon its satisfactory solution. As a broad
question, this belongs to the domain of the student of political
economy; but in view of the fact that the rampant growth of
the evil has been due in large degree to a misapprehension of
its legal bearings, as well as to criminal negligence on the
39
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part of the constituted authorities, a survey of the legal ques-tions involved would seem to be both timely and profitable.
In its simplest form, a strike is -the mere refusal of an,
employ6, or rather, of a body of employ~s, to work for theemployer for whom they have contracted to work. In that
case there is nothing criminal. Every man has a right to
work for whom he pleases, and to refuse to work if he
pleases; subject, however, to damages for breach of contract..
The morality of a strike, however, depends entirely upon its
cause. If for any breach of contract. on the part of the,
employer, or because the contract is an unfair one, it is
perfectly justifiable; but if on the other hand, the contract
was fair, and the employer has performed his part of it in
good faith, a breach by the laborer is equally unjustifiable.
For instance, if the employer has taken advantage of the.
necessity of the employ6 to hire him at a price too low to
afford him a fair subsistence, or if he refuse to pay him wages
due, a strike with the object of forcing him to fair terms, or
to pay those wages, would be proper. But if the terms of
employment are fair, and the wages are duly paid, a strike for
the purpose of obtainihg higher wages, less hours of work,
the employment of only a certain class of laborers, and the
like, is wholly inexcusable, even if not within any -legal
prohibition.
But there is another phase of the question. A mere strike,
is not the most efficient means of bringing an employer to.
terms. He can, as a general rule, hire other laborers, and go.
on with little or no inconvenience.
Accordingly, what is
known as the boycott has been devised, which consists in
preventing the use or sale of the goods manufactured or
produced by the employer; and is frequently enforced by'
causing a strike among the employ~s of those who use or
buy his goods. This carries the matter a step farther; and
is a naked interference with the personal rights of theemployers, without the shadow of an excuse on the part.
of the strikers, except that the end justifies.the means. This,
in so far as those concerned may be considered as conspiring
together, is open to the animadversion of the law. Such acts
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are not, as was very forcibly said by Justice Beach of New
York, in a recent case, as yet unreported, "indicative of
strife between capital and labor, but of one between order and
disorder, or between right and wrong. They impair and
seriously affect the constitutional privilege to pursue lawful
business without hindrance or molestation, and that privilege
must be fully protected and firmly upheld."
Finally, there is another form of strike that has not yet had
time to reach a complete development and show its full
possibilities; but fortunately for the welfare of the nation,
it probably never will until the insane portion of the population outnumbers the sane. This is the so-called "sympathetic" strike, 'which appears to consist in a cessation of work,
for no other reason than that thereby the interests of the
people at large may be so irriperilled that they will rise on
their dignity and compel some employer, between whom and
his employ~s a difference exists, to accede to the demands of
the latter. It supposes no grievance on the part of the
striker, no dispute between him and his employer; but is
utterly causeless and irrational. It is difficult to bring it
within the purview of the law, as it is so senseless a proceeding as to have never entered the mind of legislator or judge
until the labor leaders sprung it upon their attention; but its
instigators, if not the strikers themselves, are guilty of criminal
conspiracy.
The recent Chicago strike passed through all these.stages,
and its history shows very dearly their nature and operation.
It began with a strike pure and simple. Some employ~s of
the Pullman Car Company were not satisfied with their wages,
and stopped work. Then, in order to render that strike
successful, the leaders of the Arerican Railway Union
endeavored to prevent the use of Pullman cars, by ordering
its members to strike on all roads using them. That was a
boycott. Then, that not having the desired effect, the members of the union on roads not using Pullman cars were
ordered to strike. That was a sympathetic strike. Then
all the labor unionj in Chicago were ordered to strike, under
the silly impression that the people would be so injured
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thereby that they would demand a settlement of all these
other strikes. That was a sympathetic strike in the second
degree of anti-climax, in purpose and results. And then, in
one last pyrotechnic fizzle, it was attempted to order a general
strike of all'labor unions throughout the country, which
would have been the superlative degree of folly and wickedness. But by that time the moon was past the full, and Jack
being unable to find the priest all shaven and shorn, his
pasteboard house came tumbling- about his ears.
So much for the general nature of strikes. It is evident
from what has been already said that the striker exposes
himself, under varying conditions, to both a civil and a criminal
liability. The civil liability is two-fold: in the first place, to
the master for breach of contract; and in the second place, to
any third person who may be injured in person or property
by his refusal to perform that contract.
For the breach of contract he is liable in damages to the
extent of the injury directly due to the breach. That, of
course, depends on the nature of the contract, and the facts
of the case. If the employer has already broken his part of
the contract,'as by a reduction of wages, increase of hours, or
any other change in the terms of employment, the contract is
at an end, and there is no breach, and consequently no
damages. But if the breach is all on the side of the employ6
the only question is as to the amount of damage. Here the
law wholly fails to afford adequate relief. In a strike the
damage is due not so much to the individual refusal to work,
as to the concerted action of the strikers. The place of one
man could be easily filled; but the places of a whole body of
'employ~s, especially if skilled workmen, are not so quickly
supplied. In consequence of this, contracts may be forfeited,
and the money already expended in wages and the purchase
of material lost, machinery- and furnaces rendered .useless, and
many other injuries and losses caused. Yet, in such a case,
the body of strikers cannot be held liable jointly, nor can each
man be held liable for the damage due to the action of all.
".All for which he can be held responsible is for the loss caused
,by his refusal alone. That, of course, if susceptible of proof
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at all, is very slight compared with the actual damage suffered, and is not worth the expense of collection by suit;
while in many, if not the great majority of cases, the laborers
could not be forced to pay, even if a judgment were recovered
against them. And even if the damages recoverable were in
some degree responsive, and the judgments available, the
multiplicity of suits rendered necessary in many cases would
be in the highest degree oppressive and vexatious, both to the
employer and to the courts.
Furthermore, there are many items of damage that it is
wholly impossible to estimate, arising from tlie loss of prospective business and profits, the injury don to third persons
who are dependent upon the employer or his products, and
the like. One very obvious instance is that of a strike of a
body of workmen in a large establishment, the product of
whose labor is necessary to keep others employed, as is
the case in the present strike at Fall River. When they
cease work, the others, willing or unwilling, are forced to
do the same. If the butchers in a packing establishment
strike, as they did in Chicago in July, all the packers, shippers, teamsters, and so on, must stop likewise. And the
same is true of every large manufacturing establishment where
the departments of labor are specialized.
Even a better instance of such damage is afforded by a railroad strike. In such case the first element of damage is the
injury that the stoppage of work may do to the works and
apparatus of the company; then the loss from pdrishable
freight, and from failure to deliver freight and passengers at
their destination in time, all of which are capable of calculation.
But then comes the loss on the business which would have
been done during the time of idleness, which the law cannot
estimate; the loss to expecting passengers unable to .travel;.
the loss to shippers unable to send their goods; the loss to
tradesmen unable to secure needed merchandise; the losses
consequent on the general paralysis of business in the region
supplied by the road; the loss to creditors unable to collect
debts on account of the inability of others to pay, due to the
stoppage of that trade; and so on through endless ramifica-
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tions, until it is safe to say that there is not a person in the
whole district but suffers loss, directly or indirectly.
For some of these losses there are remedies; but a dead
loss always falls somewhere. The owner of freight destroyed
or detained has his remedy against the railroad; but the railroad has no remedy except that against the striker. The
railroad can recover damages for property destroyed from the
county in many cases; but the county has no remedy except
against the striker. In exiery case therefore the bulk of the
injury suffered is without remedy, and the law proves wholly
inadequate to meet the mischief.
There would seem to be no good reason why in some cases,
at least, the third person injured should not have a remedy,
also theoretical, but practically useless, against the striker, not
for breach of contract, but for a tort committed in"that breach,
by the misfeasance or nonfeasance of duty. It would appear
to be as clearly an act of negligence to leave perishable freight
side-tracked, as for a servant to drive his master's carriage
carelessly along the street; and while the master is liable in
-each case for the tort of the servant, the servant is liable
individually in the latter case, and should be so in the former.
Such a liability is enforceable against a boycotter, for his
tortious inference with the business of the person boycotted:
Steamship Co. v. McKenna, 3o Fed. Rep. 48; Moores v.
Bricklayers' Union, 23 Wkly Law Bull. 48; Carew v. Rutherford, io6 Mass. I.
The criminal liability of the striker is capable of more
efficient enforcement. -It also has a twofold aspect, the one
growing out of the act of striking, the other out of the acts
done in pursuance of the strike. The latter, as a general
xule, forces itself much more prominently before the public.
As has been said, the theoretical strike is a harmless affair,
-whether morally justifiable or not, being nothing but a cessation of work; but practically it is far different. There is no
such thing as a peaceable strike. SN/ch a strike could not
succeed. Mere supineness on the part of the employ~s would
inevitably result, sooner or later, in their places being filled
with new employ6s, and the business of the employer being
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successfully prosecuted, while they themselves would be
permanently thrown out of work. Accordingly, it becomes
an absolute requisite of success that new employ6s be kept
away, by force if necessary, and this, if peaceably done, is none
the less a violation of the right of the employer to employ
whom he pleases. If done by violence, as is usual, it is not
only a violation of the rights of the employer, but of the
intending employ6, as well as. a violation of positive law,
resulting at times even in murder. The proofs of this are
to be seen in the papers almost daily. We read of wanton
attacks made upon men whose only offence was that they had
taken the places of strikers, of dynamite placed under the
houses in which they boarded, of shots fired through their
windows, of poison placed in their food. Again, we read
of the property of the employers being destroyed in sheer
malice, by fire or other instrument of destruction, of reckless
defiance of legal authority, of talk at least bf open rebellion.
At times, as at Homestead, the rebellion is all but a fact.
Assavlt, riot, arson, murder, treason-this is a pretty list
of offences to compare with the impudent claim, made at
every strike, that the strikers are acting only on their legal
rights.
It is no excuse, as has been argued and refuted time and
again, to urge that these crimes are committed, not by the
strikers themselves, but by the criminal classes, who take the
opportunity of indulging their evil propensities. This is no
doubt true to some extent, but not by any meang to the
extent claimed, as witness the Homestead poisoning case,
which is the most noted example of modern times. Even if
it were true, the strikers would not stand acquitted of blame,
for it is their action that incites and encourages the others;
and they stand rather in the light of accessories than otherwise, as there are but few recorded instances in which they
have interfered to check criminal excesses. Both morally
and legally, they are responsible for most of the crimes thus
committed.
The strike is itself criminal in many cases. If it have no
valid reason, but is merely an attempt to coerce the employer
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to accede to the demands of his employ6s by leaving his
service in a body, it is an indictable conspiracy at common
law, equally with an attempt to induce a workman to leave
his master's employ: R. v. Ferguson, 2 Starkie,.489; R.v.
Bykerdike, I M. & Rob. 179; R. v. Duffield, 5 Cox C. C.
404; R. v. Rowlands, 5 Cox C. C. 437, 466; S. C., 17 Q. B.
671; R. v. Brown, 12 Cox C. C. 316;.State v. Glidden, 55
Conn. 46; S.C., 8 Atl. Rep. 89o; State v. Donaldson, 32. N. J.
L. 151; Peo. v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9; State v. Stewart, 59 Vt.
273; S. C., 9 Atl. Rep. 559; Crump v. Com., 84 Va. 927;
S. C., 6 S. E. Rep. 620. Vermont has adopted .this rule by
statute, R. L. Vt. §§ 4226, 4227, but Pennsylvania and New
Jersey have abandoned it in favor of a weaker doctrine, by
permitting the use of peaceable persuasion to induce others to
quit service: Acts Pa. 1872, June 14, P. L. 1175, and 1876,
April 20, P. L. 45; Rev. Sup. N. J. p. 774,. § 30, wholly
overlooking the fact that in so doing they deprive the
employer of his best protection; that it is not the manner
of the persuasion, but the persuasion itself, that makes the
act criminal; that thetwrongfulness of the persuasion depends
not upon its nature between the persuader and employ6, but
upon its results as affecting the rights of the employer; and
that the legalizing of a crime is a dangerous precedent.
Yet even this criminal remedy has proved inefficient, owing,
as in the case of the civil remedy, to the expense and difficulty
of prosecuting it fully. It would of course be impossible to
prosecute criminal actions at one and the same time, against
thousands of persons scattered over a large territory, all of
whom are ready to defend at any length, without great cost
and harassing of the courts. The very idea of punishing all
the offenders is therefore preposterous; and the punishment
of a select few only tends, in many instances, toencourage the
rest by their impunity. Eyen if the leaders are .convicted,
there are always plenty of others willing, for the sake of a.
little brief authority, to emulate their prowess and take their
chances. Add to this the fact that the union movement is so
.idespread that it is almost impossible to secure a jury without
union sympathies, and it will be clear that the criminal remedy,

THE LEGAL SIDE OF THE STRIKE QUESTION.

at least as at present existing, fails, equally with the civil, to
afford adequate protection and redress.
This state of facts affords good ground for the interference
of equity; and of late years the tendency has been to invoke
its assistance. That has been granted on the grounds previously mentioned as negativing the efficiency of the legal
remedies, the inadequacy of the remedy on the contract or
tort, and the prevention of multiplicity of suits: See Blindell
v. Hagan, 54 Fed. Rep. 4o; S. C. aff, 56 Fed. Rep. 696.
So, where strikers enter the premises of the employer,* and
interfere with the men at work there, their acts will be enjoined
as a continuing trespass and irreparable injury: N. Y., L. E.
& W. R. R. v. Wenger, 17 Wkly. Law Bull. 3o6; Coeur
D'Alene Co. v. Miners' Union of Wardner, 51 Fed. Rep. 26o.
The mere fact that the act sought to be enjoined is also,
criminal, will not oust the jurisdiction of equity. It is true
that a crime, as such, will not be enjoined; but the reason of
that is that the court will not suppose that a crime is intended,
and theref6re cannot take cognizance of the act until it is
committed; but that rule cannot be extended to a case where
the continuance or repetition of an act, criminal in one respect,
leaves no reasonable doubt as to the intention to commit it,
such as the maintenance of a public nuisance, the commission
of a continuing trespass, the keeping of an unlicensed saloon,
and the like. The injunction in such a case issues to remedy
the private wrong, not the public offence; and has riothing to,
do with the latter. It rests upon the principle that permits a
suit at law to be maintained concurrently with a criminal
prosecution, and represents the civil remedy for the criminal
act. It will accordingly lie in any case where the civil remedy
would lie, when that is inadequate, and may be either negative
or mandatory, as the circumstances of the case require; for
when the status quo would inflict irreparable injury, a mandatory injunction will issue to change that status: Beadel v.
Perry, 3 L. R. Eq. 465 ; Whitecar v. Michenor, 37 N.J. Eq.
6; Broome v. N. Y. & N. J. Telephone Co., 42 N. J. Eq. 141;
S. C., 7 At. Rep. 85 I. The remedy by injunction has the
further advantage that it can be enforced by summary process
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for contempt: Lake Erie & W. R. R. Co. v. Bailey, 61 Fed.
Rep. 495.
For some reason, probably political, this remedy does not
:seem to have been invoked in the State courts to any extent,
at least directly against the strikers, though interference by
third parties with the business of an employer by means of the
boycott and kindred annoyances has been restrained: Sherry
v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212; S. C., 17 N. E. Rep. 307. It has
been found more convenient, by the failroads at least, against
which most large strikes are directed, to institute such pro-ceedings in the Federal courts, under the Interstate Commerce
Acts, especially that of July 2, 189o: 26 U. S. Stat. at Large,
c. 647, p. 209. Since the passage of that act, every combination in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States is illegal; and a strike or a boycott can no longer be
effective, as they necessarily affect interstate commerce:
Waterhouse v. Comer, 55 Fed. Rep. 149. Any combination
of men to secure or compel the.employment of none but union
men becomes a combination in restraint of interstate commerce, within the meaning of the statute, when, in order to
gain its ends, it seeks to enforce, and does enforce, by violence
and intimidation, a discontinuance of labor in all departments
of business, including the transportation of goods from State
to State, and to and from foreign nations; and an injunction
will be granted to restrain them from so doing: U. S. v.
Workingmen's Amalgamated Council of New Orleans, 54
Fed. Rep. 994.
This reasoning applies with more force to the case of a
common carrier, such as a'railroad, than to any other; and
there is hardly an instance in which the Federal courts have
refused to grant the relief asked, their tendency being to
enlarge the remedy rather than curtail it. The first important
case was that of the strike .on the Toledo and Ann Arbor
road in 1892. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
had struck for some',reason of dissatisfaction, and it was
attempted to make the strike ,effectual by boycotting the road,
that is, compelling other roads to refuse to receive and handle
its cars under threat of extending the strike to them. The
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Ann Arbor road thereupon filed a bill against its connecting
lines, and their employ~s, praying that the latter might be
restrained from refusing to handle its cars, which was accordingly granted: Toledo, A. A. & N. M. Ry. v. Penna. Co.,'
54 Fed. Rep. 746. The court went a step farther, and, being
asked for an injunction against Mr. Arthur, the Chief of the
Brotherhood, to restrain him from issuing, promulgating or
.continuing in force any order of the Brotherhood requiring
any employ~s of any defendant railroad company to refuse to
handle and deliver any cars of freight in course of transportation from one State to another, etc., but finding that order
already issued, granted a mandatory injunction to compel him
-to rescind it: Toledo, A. A. & N. M. Ry. Co. v. Penna. Co.,
54 Fed. Rep. 730.

In the Chicago strike, however, a form of injunction, based
on this ground of interference with interstate commerce, was
adopted generally throughout the region affected, which has
become famous as the "omnibus injunction." Its essential
parts were as follows: "Eugene V. Debs, etc., and all other
persons combining and conspiring with them, and all other
persons whomsoever, are enjoined absolutely to refrain from
interfering with or stopping any of the business of any of the
railroads in Chicago engaged as carriers of passengers and
freight between States, and from interfering with mail, express,
or other trains, whether freight or passenger, engaged in interstate commerce, or destroying the property of any of the
railroads; from entering their grounds for the pui-pose of
stopping trains or interfering with property

.

.

.; from

compelling or inducing by threats, or perguasion, or violence,
any of the employ6s of said roads to refuse or fail to perform
-any of their duties as employes of such road in connection
with interstate commerce of such railroad, or the carrying of
mail, passengers, or freight, or attempting to induce by threats
or intimidation any of the employ~s of such roads engaged in
interstate business or operation of mail trains, to leave the
service of such roads, or preventing any persons from entering
the service of such roads."
This leaves little more to be desired in its special province,
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being, as the district attorney said it was intended to be, averitable dragnet, involving in its meshes all possible offenlers
against the law. It has, however, this fault in common withall the other remedies thus far mentioned, that it is remedial
only. It does not operate to prevent a strike, but to hinderthe commission of illegal acts in furtherance of that strike;and is, therefore, in so far ineffective to cure the evil. But.
one bold effort in that direction has been made, which suc-ceeded in bringing down upon its author the woes of a con-gressional investigation. ,Judge Jenkins, in Farmers' Loan
and Trust Co. v. N. Pac. Ry. Co.,.6o Fed. Rep. 803, issued a
remarkable injunction, in effect forbidding the employ&s ofthdt road to carry out a threat to strike and leave its service.
The injunction restrained them '" from combining and con-spiring to quit, with or without notice, the service of said
receivers, with the object and intent of crippling the propertyin their custody, or embarrassing the operation of said rail-road, and from so quitting the service of the said receivers,.
with or without iotice, as to cripple the property or to pre-vent or hinder the operation of said railroad." This wasi
vigorously animadverted on from several quarters, and theinvestigating committee, while very considerately exonerating
the judge from all accusations of unfairness and abuse of
power, recommended that legislation be adopted to prevent arecurrence of such action, which report was adopted by theJudiciary Committee of the House.
All the arguments against the exercise of such a power rest:
on a fancied arbitrary right of an employ6 to work or not forwhom he pleases. That right only exists at birth, if ever;fof in human society there is no such thing as an absoluteunqualified right to anything. All rights are relative. A.
man has a right to enjoy his personal liberty, or his personal
property; but if he infringes .the rights of his fellows in theserespects, his rights are Pro tanto gone, and revive again onlyon the satisfaction of the demands made upon him for thatviolation. So in this case, the right of a man to quit work
must of necessity be governed by the nature of his employment and the rights of third persons. Granting that the
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employer's only right is to recover for breach of the contract,
it does not follow that the rights of third persons who have-no
remedy are to be recklessly jeopardized. Judge Jenkins has
very forcibly stated this side of the question. "One has not
the right arbitrarily to quit service without regard to the
necessities of that service. His right of abandonment is
limited by the assumption of that service, and the conditions
and exigencies attaching thereto. It would be monstrous if a
surgeon, upon demand and refusal of larger compensation,
could lawfully abandon an operation partially performed,
leaving his knife in the bleeding body of his patient. It
would be monstrous if a body of surgeons, in aid of such
demand, could lawfully combine and conspire to withhold
their services. . . . It would be intolerable if counsel
were permitted to demand larger compensation, and to enforce
his demand by immediate abandonment of his duty in the
midst of a trial. It would be monstrous if the bar of a court
could combine and conspire in aid of such extortion by one of
its members, and refuse their service. I take it that in such
case, if the judge of the court had proper appreciation of the
duties and functions of his office, that court, for a time, would
be without a bar, and the jail would be filled with lawyers.
It.cannot be conceded that an individual has the legal right to
abandon service whenever he may please. His right to leave
is dependent upon duty, and his duty is dictated and measured
by the exigency of the situation." 6o Fed. Rep., p. 812.
This terse, vigorous argument leaves little more to be said.
It may be added, however, that conceding all that is claimed
on the other side, the injunction granted by. the judge does
not violate any principle of law. It may be taken as true
that a contract of service cannot be specifically enforced, either
directly or indirectly, though that is an arbitrary rule of
equity, and could be rescinded at will: Stocker v. Brockelbank, 3 MacN. & G. 250; Johnson v. Railroad, 3 DeG. M.
& G. 914; Lumley v. Wagner, I DeG. M. & G. 604; but the
injunction granted by Judge Jenkins did not enforce service.
All that it enjoined was the conspiracy to quit, leaving the
right to quit as individuals untouched. In short, he simply
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followed out the principles on which the prior decisions werefounded to their logical conclusion, and enjoined the illegal,
injurious action threatened, while not in the least interfering
with the legal rights of the employ6s. The precedent is an
admirable one, and if followed would go far to simplify the
question of strikes. It is to be hoped Congress will adopt it,
rather than the measures suggested by the report of the
Judiciary Comimittee.
It is the more to be regretted that that body adopted such
a course, as it is in line with the lax tendency noticeable in
such matters of late years, and which led to the passing of
the statutes of Pennsylvania and New Jersey already cited.
Any encouragement of crime is sure to bring about a recrudescence of criminality, and this has been true in this case.
The Pennsylvania statutes were followed by the Pittsburgh
riots of 1877, the Reading strike and the Homestead strike;
the legislation adopted by Congress after that last outbreak,
forbidding the movement of armed bodies of men from one.
state to another, was followed by the New York strike and
the coal strike in the bituminous coal regions; while the report
of 'the Judiciary Committee on the Jenkins injunction,was.
followed so closely by the Debs rebellion that its heels must
have suffered considerably. The only effect of toleration .of
crime is to encourage it, and if that is not now clear with
respect to strike legislation it never will be. The need is of
repressive legislation, the more stringent the better, something
that will teach the lawbreakers that they 'must respect the
rights of others; and above all, measures that will render it
impossible for any unprincipled, irresponsible demagogue to.
hold in his hands the welfare of a whole region.

